Plantinga\u27s Parity Thesis by McLeod, Mark S.
Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
McLeod, Mark S., "Plantinga's Parity Thesis" (1993). Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology. Paper 9.
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality/9
[ 6 ] 
Plantinga' s Parity Thesis 
Alvin Plantinga's epistemology of religion is no less complex 
than Alston's. It can be divided into two parts. The first, both 
historically and in the order I consider it here (this and the next 
chapter) , is Plantinga's development of the notion of the proper 
basicality of beliefs; this is his clearest defense of the parity thesis. 
In this context, Plantinga's chosen language is that of "epistemic 
justification" and "rationality. " This is to be contrasted with the 
second part of his epistemology, in which Plantinga develops and 
defends his account of "epistemic warrant" or "positive epistemic 
status. "  There his concern is the quality, property, or thing, 
enough of which converts mere true belief into knowledge. In the 
essays and books in which he considers these issues, he does not 
explicitly consider a parity thesis. Nevertheless, I discuss this as­
pect of his epistemology in Chapter 9. 
In defending his version of the parity thesis, Plantinga encour­
ages us to reconsider epistemic foundationalism and its relationship 
to theistic belief. He further urges us to reject evidentialism, 
which, he claims, is rooted in a certain version of foundationalism. 
In this chapter my initial concern is to introduce Plantinga's earlier 
work on rationality, noting the major tenets of his understanding 
of foundationalism as well as his arguments against evidentialism 
and the particular foundationalist understanding of justification he 
claims undergirds it. From this discussion emerges a description of 
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Plantinga's version of the parity thesis. I then suggest a challenge 
to it. 
I. Foundationalism 
Plantinga's general concern is whether belief in God, that is, the 
belief "God exists, "  can be (as opposed to is) rational. 1 To show 
how it can be rational, he tries to show how it can be "properly 
basic" in a foundational system of justification. On Plantinga's ac­
count, epistemological foundationalism is a normative view. 2  One 
of its goals is to lay down conditions for rational belief. He writes: 
"According to the foundationalist, there is a right way and a 
wrong way with respect to belief. People have responsibilities, du­
ties and obligations with respect to their believings just as with 
respect to their (other) actions. "  To be rational, then, "is to exer­
cise one's epistemic powers properly-to exercise them in such a 
way as to go contrary to none of the norms for such exercise. "3 To 
be rational, on this account, is something a person does; it has to 
do with one's responsibility or, more broadly, one's following the 
norms in epistemic matters. Having stated what it is to be rational, 
of course, does not obviously clarify the related issue of epistemic 
justification of belief. Here Plantinga is sometimes unclear. He ap­
parently uses the terms "rational" and "irrational" interchangeably 
with "justified" and "unjustified. "  And his claims are, on the one 
hand, about beliefs: beliefs are rational (or justified) . On the other 
hand, he talks about rational noetic structures (or even simply of "be­
ing rational, " as in the above quotation) . In the main, his concern 
seems to be justified belief. We can, then, pass over the notion of 
1. Normally, Planting a speaks not of the belief that God exists but of belief in 
God. The latter is to be understood as the former. I follow Plantinga in this conve­
nient shorthand. Also, as it turns out, the general concern for Plantinga is beliefs 
about God and his activity (e.g., God's creation of the flowers), from which there 
is an immediate inference to "God exists." Again, for convenience, I sometimes do 
not distinguish between the belief that God exists and other theistic beliefs. 
2. At least he thinks this in the account given in the Reformed epistemology 
essays published between 1979 and 1985, the essays and ideas around which this 
chapter is written. 
3. Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceed­
ings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (1980): 49-62, quotation pp. 
53-54· 
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rationality iiberhaupt and concern ourselves with the justification or 
propriety of beliefs .  We can do this safely because Plantinga's com­
ments about rationality are tied closely to his comments about jus­
tification, both being normative notions and, presumably, the jus­
tification of (most of) one's believings being at least necessary for 
the rationality of one's noetic structure or more generally for one's 
being (epistemically) rational. 
First, then, some comments about Plantinga's notion of noetic 
structure. He says: "A person's noetic structure is the set of propo­
sitions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that 
hold among him and these propositions. "4 These relations include 
the basis relation (that I believe p on the basis of q), the supports 
relations (that one belief or set of beliefs provides evidential back­
ing for another belief), and the propriety of beliefs (those that are 
inferential are "properly nonbasic" only if appropriately based on 
others, and those that are noninferential are "properly basic" only 
if certain hard-to-specify conditions are met). Plantinga also men­
tions strength of belief, depth of ingression, epistemic history, and 
relations between belief and acceptance as candidates for important 
aspects of noetic structures. Of all these aspects of noetic struc­
tures, I concentrate on the notion of properly basic beliefs. 
Plantinga notes various types of foundationalism and isolates 
two in particular: classical (or strong) and weak. He writes: "Sup­
pose we say that weak foundationalism is the view that (I) every 
rational noetic structure has a foundation [i. e. , a set of properly 
basic beliefs], and (2) in a rational noetic structure, non-basic belief 
is proportional in strength to support from the foundations . "  Clas­
sical foundationalism, in contrast, consists of weak foundational­
ism plus certain specified criteria for proper basicality. What are 
those criteria? "Ancient and medieval foundationalists tended to 
hold that a proposition is properly basic for a person only if it is 
either self-evident or evident to the senses; modern foundational­
ists-Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and the like-tended to hold that 
a proposition is properly basic for S only if either self-evident or 
incorrigible for S. "5 Plantinga sometimes identifies classical foun­
dationalism as the disjunction of ancient and medieval with mod-
4· Ibid. 
s. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
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ern foundationalism, but he does not always do so. In places he 
treats classical foundationalism simply as modern foundationalism. 
Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "classical foundational­
ism" in the broader, disjunctive sense. 
The belief that God exists is, of course, neither self-evident, nor 
incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. If Plantinga is to show how 
belief in God can be properly basic, he must show that classical 
foundationalism is false. One of his goals is to accomplish that 
task. 
2. Evidentialism 
By showing classical foundationalism to be false and arguing 
that belief in God can be properly basic in some other foundational 
system of justification, Plantinga may be able to show how belief 
in God can be epistemically justified. But the so-called irrationality 
(nonjustified status) of belief in God should not be seen simply as a 
problem arising out of classical foundationalism. In a significant 
way, says Plantinga, the charge of irrationality-that belief in God 
is not justified-is rooted in "evidentialism" and can be generally 
stated as the "evidentialist objection to theistic belief. "6 
Evidentialism is the view represented by the following: 
(I) There are obligations or standards of excellence with re­
spect to belief. 
Additionally, Plantinga cites a claim of W. K. Clifford:7 
(2) "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to be­
lieve anything upon insufficient evidence. " 
How are the obligations or standards of (1) to be understood? Plan­
tinga's earliest Reformed epistemology essays suggest several dif-
6. Just as foundationalism is a normative thesis, so is evidentialism. Some of 
Plantinga's claims about evidentialism are virtually identical to his claims about 
foundationalism. See Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 
p. 53, and "Reason and Belief in God," p. 30. 
7. As quoted in Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 25; from W. K. 
Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, vol. 2, Essays and Reviews 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1879), originally in Contemporary Review, 1877. 
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ferent forms the obligations might assume, but he moves in a later 
essay to a model employing the notion of standards rather than 
obligations. The motivation for this shift need not concern us here. 8 
But perhaps the following captures more of Plantinga's spirit in 
characterizing evidentialism: 
(2') It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective 
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence. 
We can understand (2') to be a more explicit expression of (2) . 
Plantinga gives a list of evidentialists that includes Aquinas, Des­
cartes, Locke, Blanshard, Russell, Scriven, Clifford, and Flew. 
What common philosophical view is shared by this otherwise var­
ied collection of philosophers? In part it is a view about the epi­
stemic status that belief in God must have if it is justified. Follow­
ing (1) and (2'), they all agree that 
(3) It is irrational or unreasonable to accept theistic belief in 
the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons. 
Some evidentialists also hold a further claim: 
(4) We have no evidence or at any rate not sufficient evidence 
for the proposition that God exists. 9 
Others do not. Here the evidentialist objection comes to the fore. 
The objection is rooted in the alleged truth of claims (I), (2'), (3) , 
and (4) and concludes that belief in God is not justified. Thus, all 
evidentialist objectors are evidentialists, but the converse is not 
true. Evidentialism, then, is the view that minimally (I ) ,  (2'), and 
(3) are true. The evidentialist objection is that evidentialism is true, 
as is (4). Thus, the belief that God exists ought not to be held or is 
noetically unfortunate, untidy, or substandard. 
Plantinga disagrees with the evidentialist objector on at least two 
8. For obligations, see, for example, Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 
pp. 3 r-34. For standards, see Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Ob­
jection to Belief in God," in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: 
New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wain­
wright (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1986), p. II r. 
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 27. 
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accounts. First, he thinks there is evidence for the belief that God 
exists. 10 Although this disagreement is important, I do not explore 
it here. Second, he thinks evidence is not needed for justified belief 
in God. The evidentialist responds that nothing is more reasonable 
than (3); if there is no evidence or reason to believe in God, one 
should not do so on pain of irrationality. But Plantinga does not 
mean by his claim that no evidence whatsoever is needed for justi­
fied belief in God. What he means by "reason" or "evidence" is not 
simply justification in all its varied forms. Rather, he has in mind 
discursive justification. We can say that a belief p is discursively 
justified for some person S when S holds p because of some other 
belief or beliefs she holds. Presumably, the truth of these other 
beliefs is taken by S to make p's truth more likely than if they were 
not true. Plantinga does not give a complete account of the rela­
tionship between the justifying belief(s) and the justified belief, but 
we can surmise that it must be some sort of inferential relationship. 
Discursive justification does not include, then, noninferential justi­
fication. It does not include justification where p is justified by 
some sort of experience (e.g . ,  my being appeared to in a certain 
way) or by some feature of the proposition itself (e.g . ,  self-evi­
dence). Thus, in the typical case, the belief that 2 + 1 = 3 is not 
discursively justified but held on the grounds of self-evidence. 
When Plantinga speaks of evidentialists holding (3), he attributes to 
them the view that belief in God must be discursively justified. 
A problem with Plantinga's claims arises here. Claim (2') is that 
evidence is needed for any belief to be intellectually nondefective or 
intellectually permissible. If Plantinga understands evidence as dis­
cursive justification and (2') is true, then every belief must be jus­
tified by some other belief. Foundational models of justification 
seem to be excluded. But I think this is simply a slip of the pen. 
Plantinga need not attribute the stronger view to the evidentialist; 
the evidentialist need not claim that all beliefs must be discursively 
justified. She need only claim that beliefs that cannot be (or are 
not) properly nondiscursive, as far as their justification is con­
cerned, must be discursively justified. In fact, Plantinga claims, ev­
identialism is rooted in classical foundationalism. Thus, the beliefs 
ro. See, for example, the ontological argument in Plantinga, God, Freedom, and 
Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 85-II2. 
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that are properly basic-those beliefs that are either self-evident, 
incorrigible, or evident to the senses-need not be provided evi­
dence in the way (2') demands. Claim (2') should be replaced by 
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective 
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief 
requiring discursive justification. 
Naturally, if the evidentialist objector's challenge is to make sense, 
the belief "God exists" must require discursive justification. Thus, 
(3) should be replaced by 
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, 1t 1s 
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic 
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons. 
Our corrected picture of evidentialism is that minimally {I), 
(2*), and (3*) are true. The evidentialist objector believes not only 
that evidentialism is true but that (4) is also true. Thus, belief in 
God is irrational. Plantinga can now be seen as rejecting (3*) and 
(4). 
Despite Plantinga's disagreements with (3*) and (4), he does 
think (I) is true. He writes that "it seems plausible to hold that 
there are obligations and norms with respect to belief, and I do not 
intend to contest this assumption."'' Extrapolating from his later 
work, I assume he would no longer put forth this claim alone but 
instead make appropriate modifications in light of the demands of 
noetic excellence or nondefectiveness. 12 Thus, he would affirm 
(I*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other) 
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief which, 
when followed, provide permissive justification for a be­
lief. 
The evidentialist thus would hold (I*), (2*), and (3*), and the evi­
dentialist objector would add (4). 
r I. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 3 I. 
12. Whether (2*) is something Plantinga believes is not clear. I presume he 
would not obviously disagree, but I suspect he would be hesitant to say that there 
is a class of beliefs whose members noetically demand discursive justification. 
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Two aspects of Plantinga's thought deserve special attention. 
First, his account of epistemic justification is an account of a nor­
mative notion of epistemic justification. 13 Although he does not 
spell out the details of the position, the notion of justification with 
which he is concerned is in the neighborhood of permissive justi­
fication, that is, what one is permitted to believe given that one has 
done as much as can be expected vis-a-vis the normative require­
ments for belief, whether those requirements are deontologically 
based or otherwise. Second, he disagrees not only with the eviden­
tialist objector but also with some of the claims of the evidentialist. 
Not only is there discursive evidence for belief in God, but even 
were there not, belief in 'God could nonetheless be justified. Al­
though Plantinga holds that discursive justification for belief in 
God can be given, it is not required for justification, at least in the 
sense of permissive, normative justification. The evidentialist is 
wrong; belief in God does not require discursive justification. 
We are not yet in a position to state Plantinga's version of the 
parity thesis. We do know that it involves a permissive, normative 
notion of justification (not unlike Alston's Jnw• in some respects) . It 
also includes some reference to the fact that theistic beliefs need not 
be nonbasic but can be properly basic. 
3. The Failure of Classical Foundationalism 
Plantinga argues in two ways against classical foundationalism. Let 
us call these the "incoherence argument" and the "widespread belief 
argument. "  First, the incoherence argument. Plantinga captures clas­
sical foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality in this way:14 
(5) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and 
only if p is either self-evident to S, incorrigible for S, or 
evident to the senses for S. 
On the classical foundationalist's view, not only is the disjunction 
of the criteria sufficient for proper basicality, but it is necessary as 
well. Plantinga's concern is with the necessity of the criteria. 
13. He may hold other understandings of justification to be plausible as well. 
And he certainly holds that normative justification and epistemic warrant are not 
the same thing; see Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," 
pp. 2-3· 
14. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 59. 
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According to classical foundationalism, says Plantinga, beliefs 
are either properly basic, properly nonbasic, or not justified. Plan­
tinga asks, of these alternatives, which is (5)? To be justified, (5) 
must be either properly basic or properly nonbasic. If it is properly 
basic it must be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the 
senses. It is none of these. It must, then, be properly nonbasic. To 
be properly nonbasic, (5) must be supported by a belief from the 
foundation. Is it thus supported? It is not easy to see how. In sum­
mary the challenge is this. If the statement of the criteria, that is, 
(5), cannot be anchored, as it were, by its own expressed criteria, 
how is it to be anchored? If it cannot be anchored on classical foun­
dationalism's own grounds, it is either noetically substandard or 
we ought not believe it. Classical foundationalism is self-referen­
tially incoherent. 
The widespread belief argument simply has it that, even were it 
coherent to believe (5), such an account of epistemic justification 
would make many of our beliefs unjustified. Plantinga has in mind 
beliefs about the past and other minds. These follow neither de­
ductively, inductively, nor on a probabilistic basis from the basic 
beliefs allowed by (5) . This shows that (5) is false or at least un­
justified, for surely many beliefs about other minds and the past are 
justified. Here Plantinga's parity thesis begins to emerge, for the 
development of a theory that allows us to hold that these wide­
spread beliefs are justified leads to a theory that allows belief in 
God to be justified on similar grounds. He concludes that, given 
these two arguments, classical foundationalism is in poor shape. It 
is not, according to Plantinga, a viable epistemic model for norma­
tive, permissive justification. 15 
4· Plantinga's Nonclassical, Normative 
Foundationalism 
The death of classical foundationalism does not signal the end of 
all foundational models of justification; Plantinga remains a foun­
dationalist .  Two further points are relevant in this regard. First, a 
beliefs being neither self-evident, incorrigible, nor evident to the 
15. I believe he would add that classical foundationalism is not a viable epi­
stemic model for many other kinds of justification as well, including that justifica­
tion ("warrant") needed for knowledge. 
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senses does not rule out its being properly basic. The rejection of 
the classical criteria does not leave the foundationalist with no­
where to turn. Having shown that the classical criteria do not pro­
vide necessary conditions for proper basicality does not entail the 
nonexistence of all criteria. Just as the critic of the verification prin­
ciple of meaningfulness does not, on showing the principle false, 
have to admit that there are no criteria for meaningfulness, Plan­
tioga does not have to admit that there are no criteria for proper 
basicality after rejecting the classical criteria. 
Second, on rejecting a particular set of criteria for proper ba­
sicality one need not have a replacement in order to recognize be­
liefs as properly basic. One need not know what the criteria are in 
order to recognize that some beliefs are properly basic. Also, one 
need not know the criteria to recognize that something is not prop­
erly basic. Again, just as the critic of the verification principle of 
meaningfulness can know that "T'was brillig and the slithy toves 
did gyre and gymble in the wabe" is not meaningful, the critic of 
the classical criteria can know that some belief is not properly ba­
sic, even though neither critic is able to replace the rejected criteria. 
One can remain a foundationalist without an explicit account of 
the criteria for foundational beliefs. 
What of the criteria, then? Are there criteria necessary and suffi­
cient for proper basicality? It is less than clear that there are, for 
Plantinga's suggested method for discovering the criteria leads to a 
much more open understanding of the role of criteria for proper 
basicality than that provided by classical models of foundational­
ism. He writes in this now oft-quoted passage that 
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking, 
inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such 
that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter . . . . We 
must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient condi­
tions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by references 
to those examples. Under the right conditions, for example, it is 
clearly rational to believe that you see a human person before you: a 
being who has thoughts and feelings, who knows and believes 
things, who makes decisions and acts. It is clear, furthermore, that 
you are under no obligation to reason to this belief from others you 
hold; under those conditions that belief is properly basic for you. 
But then (5) . . . must be mistaken; the belief in question, under 
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those circumstances, is properly basic, though neither self-evident 
nor incorrigible [nor evident to the senses] for you. Similarly, you 
may seem to remember that you had breakfast this morning, and 
perhaps you know of no reason to suppose your memory is playing 
you tricks. If so, you are entirely justified in taking that belief as 
basic. Of course it isn't properly basic on the criteria offered by 
classical . . . foundationalists; but that fact counts not against you 
but against those criteria. 
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from 
below rather than above; they should not be presented as ex Cathe­
dra, but argued to and tested by a relevant set of examples. But there 
is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the 
examples. The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is 
entirely proper and rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the 
basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him 
and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn 
Murray O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my 
criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their ex­
amples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its 
set of examples, not to theirs. 16 
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Rather than arbitrarily legislate the criteria for proper basicality, we 
must inductively examine our noetic structures. On the basis of 
what we take to be properly basic, we must come to agreement on 
the criteria. If we disagree on which beliefs ought to be accepted as 
properly basic, our criteria are different. This suggests that proper 
basicality and its criteria are relative, in some way, person to per­
son or community to community. 
Plantinga continues by noting that criteria arrived at in the par­
ticularistic way he suggests may not be polemically useful. If we 
arrive at different criteria when using the inductive procedure, we 
may not be able to use those criteria to reject another's examples of 
properly basic beliefs. He wants to deny, however, that just any 
belief can be properly basic. He says that in fact properly basic 
beliefs stand in relation to the conditions in which they are formed, 
and this relationship provides justification for properly basic be­
liefs .  Properly basic beliefs are not, says Plantinga, groundless. 
16. Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" Nous 15 (1981): 41-51, quota­
tion p. so. 
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It is tempting to raise the following sort of question. If belief in 
God is properly basic, why cannot just any belief be properly basic? 
Could we not say the same for any bizarre aberration we can think 
of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the 
Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that 
as basic? . . . If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we 
not be committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything, 
can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irra­
tionalism and superstition? 
Certainly not. 17 
One thing is clear: Plantinga wishes to reject a certain kind of arbi­
trariness; he wants to reject an arbitrariness in which just any belief 
can be properly basic, an arbitrariness in which a Great Pumpkin 
belief is epistemically justified. 18 So, not just any belief can be taken 
as properly basic. A belief is properly basic only in certain circum­
stances-only when it is grounded. But which circumstances pro­
vide grounding? 
Plantinga does not provide a formal account of the relationship 
between beliefs and the conditions in which they are formed. He 
instead provides some hints. I focus on two points. First, if one has 
no reason to suspect that a belief is not justified, it is justified (or 
perhaps, if one has no reason to doubt one's epistemic practice, 
e. g. ,  one's memory, the beliefs it generates are justified) . Second, 
if one has done all that can be expected epistemically with regard 
to a belief, it is justified. Plantinga also provides the following ex­
amples. 19 He notes that the conditions in which the beliefs are 
formed may be much more complex than the examples suggest, 
but nonetheless "I see a tree" is properly basic if I am being appeared 
to treely, "that person is in pain" is properly basic when I am aware 
of that person displaying pain behavior, and "I had breakfast this 
morning" is properly basic if I seem to remember having breakfast 
this morning. Since these beliefs are not based on other beliefs, they 
are basic. They are not, however, arbitrary or groundless. 
I7. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 74· 
I 8. One is tempted to call this arbitrariness "relativism," but that term is surely 
a loaded one. To avoid much potential confusion, I continue in my use of the term 
"arbitrary" (and its cognates). 
I9. I refer to these as the "paradigms" of justified belief or as the "paradigms" of 
properly basic beliefs; see Chapter I, Section 2. 
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The circumstances vary the conditions in which a belief is prop­
erly basic, but if a belief is properly basic there is a true proposition 
of the sort:20 
( 6) In conditions C, S is justified in taking p as basic. 
Certain kinds of conditions thus ground certain kinds of belief as 
basic. The beliefs are justified by those conditions, although one 
does not hold the beliefs on the basis of some other belief. Such 
beliefs are nondiscursively justified or properly basic. 
Some clarifications are possible here. First, surely some features 
can be noted and agreed on which are necessarily shared by all 
properly basic beliefs. For example, p is a properly basic belief only 
if p is basic (not based on other beliefs) and proper (meets the con­
ditions for the proper basicality of p) . These purely formal cri­
teria-call them "formal" or "universal" criteria-are not, appar­
ently, of concern to Plantinga. 
A second level of criteria-call them "material" or "general" cri­
teria-can be distinguished. Self-evidence, being evident to the 
senses, and incorrigibility are examples. As Plantinga argues, these 
examples are neither severally nor jointly necessary for proper ba­
sicality. Any belief meeting one of these criteria, however, is prop­
erly basic. It may well be possible to complete the set so that a 
disjunction of these three criteria and some other criterion (or crite­
ria) forms a set necessary for proper basicality. Meeting any mem­
ber of the set (or combination of members of the set) would be 
sufficient for proper basicality, but at least one of the set must be 
met for a belief to be properly basic. This set, one might say, is the 
instantiation of the formal criterion of propriety. To be properly 
basic, a belief must meet at least one of the general criteria. 
Finally, a third level of criteria can be distinguished-call them 
"particular" criteria. My having the experience of what I take to be 
a blue patch is an example of a particular criterion. This may be a 
necessary condition of the proper basicality of the belief "I see a 
blue patch," although not for beliefs in general. Plantinga suggests 
that my being appeared to redly is necessary and sufficient for the 
proper basicality of the belief "I am appeared to redly. "21 These are 
20. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 79. 
21. See ibid. , p. 77· 
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the conditions in which "I am appeared to redly" is basic and prop­
erly so. The conditions do vary from belief to belief, and perhaps 
from moment to moment or person to person, but there nonethe­
less are conditions for each properly basic belief which confer on 
the belief the status of epistemic propriety. When one goes through 
the inductive procedure to discover the conditions in which one's 
basic beliefs are properly basic, it seems that the general criteria are 
discovered only by considering the particular criteria. The general 
criteria may then be inferred from whatever is shared in common 
by sets of particular criteria for proper basicality. Plantinga uses the 
term "criteria" to cover both what I have called material or general 
criteria and particular criteria. 22 
Thus Plantinga provides us with the outline of a nonclassical, 
normative foundationalism. There are beliefs, both basic and non­
basic. The former may be properly basic under certain conditions. 
The discovery of those conditions is up to the community (or indi­
vidual, as the case may be). The latter are, presumably, properly 
nonbasic when appropriately based on other properly basic beliefs 
or based on beliefs that are in turn based appropriately on properly 
basic beliefs and so forth. In all cases, the propriety or appropriate­
ness of the beliefs is a normative one. 
5· Proper Basicality, Theistic Beliefs, and the Parity 
Thesis 
Plantinga claims that with the collapse of classical foundation­
alism the door is open to the possibility of belief in God being 
properly basic. At least there is no reason to think that belief in 
God cannot be. In fact, Plantinga's own version of foundationalism 
is specifically designed to allow belief in God to be properly basic. 
But is belief in God truly properly basic? Those in the tradition of 
Reformed Christian theology answer affirmatively, says Plantinga, 
and he enthusiastically concurs. 23 He says little, however, about the 
conditions that ground or justify belief in God as basic. He argues 
that classical foundationalism is false but does not replace the crite­
ria he rejects with his own. He claims instead that even without 
22. I thank Bill Forgie for helpful discussion on these distinctions. 
23. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 73. 
Plantinga's Parity Thesis [ I I 9 
knowing the criteria for proper basicality one can know (in many 
cases) which beliefs are and are not properly basic. The conditions 
in which properly basic beliefs are provided grounding can thus be 
discovered inductively. From these conditions one can discover the 
criteria. Even though one does not know the conditions in which 
belief in God is properly basic, it may nevertheless be properly 
basic. The issue should not be decided without a close look at the 
beliefs of religious believers. 
Plantinga does suggest that belief in God is not groundless. He 
compares it to grounded perceptual beliefs ("I see a tree"), memory 
beliefs ("I remember eating breakfast this morning"), and beliefs 
that ascribe mental states to other humans ("That person is in 
pain"). These are the paradigm beliefs, as I suggested in Chapter I 
that we call them. Plantinga argues that, in a manner analogous to 
the grounding of these beliefs, "God exists" may be grounded. 
Following Calvin, Plantinga holds that we have a disposition to 
believe such things as "This flower was created by God" or "This 
vast and intricate universe was created by God. "24 On doing some­
thing wicked I may form the belief "God disapproves of what I 
have done." On reading the Bible one may feel compelled to be­
lieve "God is speaking to me. " These conditions ground the beliefs 
mentioned. Plantinga notes that none of these beliefs are, strictly 
speaking, the belief that God exists. But again, strictly speaking, 
what we are justified in believing is that "That person is in pain" 
rather than that "That person exists. "  We see no harm in ignoring 
the one step, immediate inference from the former to the latter, so 
it too is taken as properly basic. By analogy, there is no harm in 
saying that the belief that God exists is properly basic, even though 
there is a one step, immediate inference from the theistic claims 
mentioned above to the belief that God exists. This immediate in­
ference does not, presumably, provide anything more than a mini­
mally complex sort of discursive evidence. 
It is in this general context that Plantinga's parity thesis is most 
clearly seen. The thesis emerges when he compares theistic beliefs 
to paradigm beliefs, even though the comparison's role is not well 
spelled out. Clearly enough, however, the comparison of (or anal­
ogy between) the paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs is no mere 
24. Ibid., p. So. 
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convenience. It is a major tenet of Plantinga's position. As a first 
account of Plantinga's parity thesis, let us say that, under appropri­
ate conditions, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about God, has 
the same nonclassical, normative justification as S's belief that p*, 
where p * is a paradigm belief. Of course, the paradigm beliefs 
should not be understood to be just the three examples mentioned, 
but any beliefs of like kind. So theistic beliefs have, according to 
Plantinga, at least the same kind of epistemic standing as many of 
our commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs, insofar as permissive, 
normative justification is concerned. 25 
But, as with Alston's parity thesis, one must distinguish between 
having the same kind of epistemic justification and having the 
same level or strength of that kind. With Alston, it is clear that Jnw 
is a weaker level of Jn than is Jn"
' 
and so it is evident that his con­
cern is with level and kind. Alston also tells us that he is aiming at 
the level of epistemic justification sufficient for "rational accep­
tance. " But with Plantinga the issue is not so clear. Perhaps, how­
ever, he means us to work with the notion of proper basicality 
understood as a kind of justification, namely, noninferential nor­
mative justification. It is natural then to suggest various levels 
within that kind. Thus we can say that the level of justification 
within the range of proper basicality is to be understood as the 
same for both theistic and paradigm beliefs .  But we need to con­
sider potential overriding conditions. For example, although there 
might be levels of strength of noninferential justification, they gen­
erally have to do with special circumstances, such as that the night 
is foggy rather than clear. The belief that there is a car ahead is 
properly basic when held on a clear night. The belief that there is a 
car ahead is also properly basic on a foggy night. But the former is 
more strongly justified than is the latter even though both are 
properly basic. (It might be two motorcycles, rather than a car. In 
either case, it is time to get off the road . )  In this way, then, there 
may be a range of strengths of justification within the category of 
proper basicality; as well, some overriders may remove justifica­
tion completely. To be clear about parity, we must allow for po­
tential overriding conditions .  Thus, given no special circum-
25. Plantinga also writes, at some length, about the defeasibility of properly 
basic beliefs, noting that the justification that accrues to them is prima facie only. 
This view meshes well with his normative account, as far as he has a developed 
account, of justification; see ibid. , pp. 83-85. 
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stances, theistic beliefs and paradigm belief can have the same level 
of justification-the strongest level-of the same kind of justifica­
tion-noninferential normative proper basicality. Thus, a more ac­
curate account of Plantinga's parity thesis is 
Parity ThesisPiantinga (PT pJ): Under appropriate condi­
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p, 
where p is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical 
normative proper basicality (the strongest level) as S's be­
lief that p*, where p* is a paradigm belief. 
Thus PT PI is a broader claim than PT A• for it includes not only 
perceptual beliefs, but memory beliefs and beliefs about other 
minds as well. But both PT PI and PTA make claims not only about 
the kind but also about the level of epistemic justification. They 
differ, however, in that Alston's is a practice-based claim rather 
than a belief-based claim. 26 
Although Plantinga's discussion is broader than Alston's in that 
Plantinga's parity thesis makes reference to memory beliefs and to 
beliefs about other minds as well as to perceptual beliefs, it is easier 
in some contexts to discuss Plantinga's thesis if we narrow its 
scope. So consider a narrower version of PT p1: 
Parity Thesisi>Iantinga (PTpJ): Under appropriate condi­
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p, 
where p is a belief about God, has at least the same non-
26. Plantinga's more recent claims, in "Justification and Theism," Faith and Phi­
losophy 4 (1987): 403-26, and "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," 
point toward understanding positive epistemic status as the proper functioning of 
one's epistemic equipment. In Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper 
Function, he indicates his preference for the term "warrant" over "justification" for 
that thing, enough of which, together with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge. 
On that account, warrant is again a matter of proper functioning. The relationship 
between positive epistemic status as a necessary condition of knowledge and posi­
tive epistemic status as a condition of justification (in the normative sense being 
considered here) is not clear or, perhaps, even important. Plantinga indicated, in 
conversation, that his earlier work on Reformed epistemology asked the wrong 
questions, if one is interested in knowledge, but that perhaps there are some as yet 
uncovered relationships among knowledge, justification, and positive epistemic 
status. He does reject various accounts of normative notions of justification as 
necessary conditions of knowledge. It is thus difficult to know what to say about 
the relationship of normative, permissive justification and positive epistemic status. 
But then it is not clear that we need to have a position on the matter for the 
purposes here. I make some futher comments on this topic in Chapter 9. 
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classical normative proper basicality (the strongest level) 
as S's belief that p*, where p* is a perceptual belief. 
Since showing that the narrower thesis is false is sufficient for 
showing the broader thesis false, I concentrate mostly on the nar­
rower thesis. Hence, the majority of my discussion focuses on per­
ceptual beliefs in comparison with theistic beliefs. I return later to 
comment on memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds. 
We now have Plantinga's parity thesis before us. In the remain­
der of this chapter I present a challenge to it. 
6. The Universality Challenge Explained 
Plantinga's central goal is the defense of PT PI· Since paradigm 
beliefs can be properly basic, so can theistic beliefs. (For conve­
nience, I speak simply of proper basicality rather than the strongest 
level of proper basicality. )  I argue that PT PI or, more specifically, 
PTl>1 is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalism, or at least 
with foundationalism as far as it relies on its traditional roots. 
Foundationalism's traditional roots are, I believe, largely eviden­
tialist concerns. Contrary to Plantinga's suggestion that evidential­
ism grows out of foundationalism, foundationalism seems more 
naturally understood to grow out of evidentialism, that is, to grow 
out of the desire of the evidentialist to avoid arbitrariness, where 
"arbitrariness" means, roughly, the claim that just any belief can be 
properly basic (or, more broadly, normatively, epistemically justi­
fied). If one is to avoid this arbitrariness, if one is to follow the 
spirit of the evidentialist, then one approach is to be a founda­
tionalist about justification. But I argue that PTpJ, and hence PT Ph 
is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalist theory of justifica­
tion insofar as it rests in the desire to avoid arbitrariness. This is so, 
I argue, because of what I call the "universality challenge. " 
The universality challenge is this: given an experience shared by 
both theist and nontheist alike, nearly everyone will be led to form 
a shared nontheistic (perceptual paradigm) belief, whereas only the 
theist will be led to form a theistic belief. n So, whereas both theist 
and nontheist experience awe at the beauty of the universe, only 
27. This challenge is a more rigorous form of one presented in Richard Grigg, 
"Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga," International journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983): 123-27. 
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the theist (and perhaps not even she in every instance) will form 
a belief about God's creativity. Or perhaps more telling (because 
avoiding potential problems with the aesthetic overtones of 
"awe"), when both theist and nontheist experience a tree, both will 
form the belief "I see a tree, " whereas only the theist will (some­
times) form the belief that God made the tree. 28 The challenger 
suggests that this universality of belief formation indicates the 
firmly grounded nature of the perceptual paradigm beliefs, and 
since the experience that generates the theistic belief does not pro­
vide universality, it does not provide sufficient grounds for proper 
basicality. 
The motivation behind this challenge is broadly egalitarian in 
spirit. The idea is that every fully rational human has certain belief­
forming practices for producing justified beliefs. A general account 
of these practices might be, roughly, that if some (cognitive) input 
I is taken in by some fully rational person S, then S will form a 
Uustified) belief p whose object is of kind K. For example, if Suzie 
takes in the sensory input of tree-shapedness, then she will form 
the justified belief that she sees a tree. The universality challenge 
has the background assumption that all fully rational beings have 
these practices and that, if one does have the practice, then one will 
form the corresponding beliefs .  As far as justified belief is con­
cerned, all belief formations must be universal in this sense, includ­
ing theistic belief formations. If one rejects this assumption, then 
the universality challenge is not relevant to the parity thesis. 
To flesh this assumption out somewhat, consider the following. 
Suppose two people are looking through their home for some ob­
ject, say, a particular copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. If both 
were to enter the den, look toward the lower left corner of the 
desk, epistemic equipment in full working order, and the copy of 
Kant's first critique were lying on the desk in that area, would they 
not both form the belief "there's the copy of Kant's Critique"? Not 
clearly, and for many possible reasons. Person S1 may be distracted 
28. To be exact, perhaps not everyone forms the belief "I see a tree." Perhaps 
one is not paying attention to one's experience or is distracted by the brilliance of 
the green color and so does not form any belief. Nevertheless, when asked what it 
is one is seeing, everyone, or nearly everyone with normal experiential equipment, 
will say "I see a tree." The theistic belief or description is not universal in this 
sense. To simplify the discussion, I assume this account but refer simply to the 
beliefs being formed. 
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by something else on the desk, or by his concern that he is making 
person S2 late for her class, having asked her to help him search. 
But if S2 picks up the book, holds it in front of S1 's eyes, and says, 
"here it is, " surely S1 will form the belief in question, or something 
very close to it, or at least a belief that entails it. The point of the 
egalitarian assumption is not that we form exactly the same beliefs 
when given the same input, but that we are capable of forming a 
belief about the kind of object providing the input, and, moreover, 
that rational people typically do so. And the more fully rational 
one is, the more likely one is to form beliefs that are in agreement 
with other fully rational people. As far as we are fully rational, all 
of us have the same doxastic tendencies. We all share, qua fully 
rational people, the same objectification scheme for generating 
justified beliefs. Finally, as far as one lacks these tendencies and 
schemes, the fully rational person ought to be able to obtain them. 
Another brief example. Suppose there is a glass of water in front 
of S1 and S2• S1 forms the belief that the glass is half full, S2 that it 
is half empty. There is a disagreement in the beliefs formed. But 
presumably both would agree that one half the glass's capacity 
contains water. It is the fully rational person's tendency to form 
beliefs about a certain kind of object, given a certain input, that is 
the egalitarian assumption's concern, not the details of what S1 or S2 
focuses on. If it is a glass of water in front of them, and they are 
concentrating on that rather than something else, they will form a 
belief about the glass of water. Background beliefs and attitudes 
may affect the details of the beliefs they generate, but the belief 
will be a belief about the glass and water. 
So, as the theist and nontheist stand in front of the majestic 
mountains, both will form a belief about the mountains. Why do 
they not both form beliefs about God's creative activity in the 
mountains? Should they not both have the capacity to do so? And 
if not, why not? 
What grounds can be produced for denying or affirming what I 
have been calling the "egalitarian assumption"? Kant assumed that 
all rational creatures share the same intuitions of space and time 
and the same categorical structures. Much like this, most epis­
temologists assume that human minds work alike. In particular, 
they assume that if we are all fully rational and all take in the same 
cognitive input we will all form beliefs of the same kind, barring 
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the typical epistemologist's standard special circumstances or dis­
torting conditions (poor lighting and the like). The best argument 
in the assumption's favor is that it seems to capture part of our 
broad notion of rationality. Two rational persons, in a frame of 
mind to concentrate on a given object, will, being rational, form a 
belief about that object. If one does not, then, barring special dis­
tractions or other excuses, one is rational and the other is not in 
this instance. To be rational is to belong to a community of be­
lievers who, given the full human capabilities, form similar beliefs 
given similar inputs. The assumption thus allows for the possibility 
of epistemological research; without the assumption, or some 
broader assumption that includes it, there would be no reason to 
think we can talk about human knowledge qua human. How could 
we talk about whether a belief is rational, or rationally produced, 
unless we assume that our cognitive practices deal with a given set 
of data in the same way, at least in terms of output? If you can 
excuse yourself from the requirements of rationality simply by say­
ing that you do not have the doxastic mechanism needed to form a 
given belief but yet still claim that you are fully rational, you can 
get away with epistemic murder. Perhaps this is reason enough to 
justify the assumption. Intuitively, at least, I am inclined to accept 
the assumption, and I do not see any reason to reject it. 
Some further explanatory notes on the universality challenge are 
in order. First, it is important to understand that the universality 
challenge does not depend on the theistic belief being generated by 
an experience only the theist has. That would not count against the 
proper basicality of the theistic belief any more than your not hav­
ing the experience of the tree would count against my properly 
basic belief that I see a tree, given my experience of the tree. Nei­
ther can the challenge find a response simply in the claim that not 
everyone objectifies experiences in theistic terms because one lacks 
the disposition to do so, lacks the conceptual scheme that allows 
one to do so, or, perhaps, simply lacks the ability to do so. The 
challenge assumes that fully rational people do have the same basic 
objectification schemes. One cannot lack the needed scheme qua 
rational being. A comparison of the universality challenge to two 
challenges suggested by Alston (see Chapter 2, Section 4) is helpful 
in understanding the former. Alston writes that PP and CP differ 
in that (1) the capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found univer-
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sally among normal adult human beings, and (2) all normal adult 
human beings, whatever their culture, use basically the same con­
ceptual scheme in objectifying their sense experience. Alston's re­
sponse to these objections is that, although those kinds of univer­
sality are interesting and comforting to us, they are not necessary 
for reliability. This is shown by the fact that not everyone engages 
in the practice of pure mathematics. But it is important to under­
stand why it is true that not everyone engages in pure mathemat­
ics. Here we must move beyond Alston's suggestions. 
Does the mathematically inclined student, for example, have 
some ability or means to objectify information in mathematical 
terms that other students do not have? I think not. Even where we 
speak of students not having mathematical ability, the students in 
question typically have some ability. The ability shows up in de­
grees. Although there are some who may not engage in the prac­
tice, this is not because of a total lack of ability. Rather, those who 
do not engage in the practice of pure mathematics, even at the 
lowest levels, fail to do so simply because they have no need of it, 
never thought about it, or have never been exposed to it. For those 
of different cultures who do not engage in the practice, perhaps 
their cultures have not developed the appropriate categories even 
though in principle nothing stops individuals from so doing. The 
slave boy in Plato's Meno is relevant here. At first he does not 
engage in the practice of geometric reasoning, but he quickly 
learns that he can. In short, two people one of whom engages in 
the practice and one of whom does not should be said to differ 
because the latter lacks the epistemic practice pragmatically al­
though not in principle. I suggest that this lack is the result of the 
fact that the one capable of engaging in the practice has the appro­
priate input whereas the other does not have that input. This latter 
case is comparable to people who have no theistic experience what­
soever and hence do not generate theistic beliefs. But how do we 
explain Plantinga's cases in which both theist and nontheist have 
the same experiential input but only one forms a theistic belief? 
It could be suggested that the difference is not in experience but 
in conceptual schemes. The theist has a theistic conceptual scheme, 
the nontheist does not-rather like the Meno's slave boy, who at 
first does not have certain geometrical concepts but later does. But 
surely the average atheist or agnostic has a noetic structure that 
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contains the concept of God, in spite of all its supposed difficulties. 
This raises all kinds of interesting and complex questions about the 
relationships between experience and the conceptual schemes used 
to understand or objectify them. Do experience and scheme arise 
together? Can one have an experience without a conceptual 
scheme? To what extent do conceptual schemes shape experience? 
But we need not answer these questions in detail to understand the 
thrust of the universality challenge. It is not that there are two 
experiences or that there are two different conceptual schemes 
working. The egalitarian assumption is that everyone, given the 
same input, will generate (roughly) the same belief, or at least a 
belief whose object is the same (kind of) thing. The challenge sug­
gests, that is, that there is a close connection between the input of 
an epistemic practice (the experience, in most cases) and the con­
ceptual scheme used to objectify that input. Whenever a person 
with normal epistemic practices takes in tree-shaped data, a tree 
belief is generated. Or, as with Alston's case, the notion of theistic 
objectification relies on an account of experience in which there is 
some sort of theistic content (as I argued in Chapter 2) . In the 
experiences to which the universality challenge calls attention, 
however, there is no theistic content per se. Rather, the emphasis is 
on the shared but nontheistic nature of the experience and the con­
ditions necessary to explain why the theist forms a theistic belief 
but the nontheist does not. Since the experience is nontheistic, 
it does not matter that the experiencer has a theistic conceptual 
scheme. No theistic scheme of objectification will generate a theis­
tic belief if there is no experience on which the scheme can work its 
magic. How then does the theist legitimately generate her theistic 
belief when the nontheist does not, given only a shared, nontheis­
tic experience? 
The assumption that the experiences are nontheistic in content 
may appear to be unfair to Plantinga, but I think not. First of all, 
many, if not most, of his examples appear to have the feature that 
the experience is one that both theist and nontheist could share­
looking at the flower, reading the Bible, feeling guilty. Second, an 
important result from the criticism of PTA applies to Plantinga if 
the experiences to which Plantinga calls attention are understood as 
having a theistic content not shared by the nontheist. Such exam­
ples fall prey to the background belief challenge. If the experiences 
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allow for noninferential justification, it is not of the conceptual­
reading but only of the noninferential mediated variety. Insofar as 
the experiences are taken to be direct experiences of God, there is 
nothing phenomenologically given in the experience that allows 
one to say truly, "this is phenomenologically an experience of 
God. " There must be background beliefs in the justification of the 
belief that one's experience is an experience of God. These back­
ground beliefs provide the mitigating circumstances that poten­
tially weaken the level of justification of the theistic belief, since 
these beliefs may themselves fail to have justification. Thus the an­
tecedent conditions set out in PT PI or PTJ,h namely, that there are 
no overriding conditions, may never be met. This in itself may 
remove the possibility that theistic and perceptual paradigm beliefs 
have the kind of parity suggested by PTJ,1. One does not use back­
ground beliefs to form the perceptual paradigm beliefs, but one 
does use them in the formation of beliefs about God. In the theistic 
cases, as in, perhaps, any case dealing with epistemically unique 
individuals, one may not have the strongest level of proper ba­
sicality, for such beliefs involve a special role for beliefs as opposed 
to concepts alone. 29 In defending PTJ,h Plantinga cannot retreat to 
unshared experiences with theistic content. Such experiences can­
not be direct, conceptual-reading experiences of God, since back­
ground beliefs are part of the epistemic conditions needed for justi­
fication. 
The universality challenge thus suggests that, when an exper­
ience is shared by a theist and a nontheist, both should form 
(roughly) the same beliefs, including theistic beliefs. If this does 
not occur, then that fact needs explaining. It is not sufficient to 
suggest that the theist has a practice by which she generates the 
theistic belief whereas the nontheist does not have the practice, for, 
by the egalitarian assumption, one should expect, given the same 
(cognitive) input, that theist and nontheist should both form the 
same belief. Of course, if the egalitarian assumption is false, then 
the universality challenge is irrelevant. But then some other story 
29. It will not do for Plantinga to make the content of the beliefs part of the 
conceptual scheme as in hyper-Kantian category analogues for the reasons Forgie 
rejects the hyper-Kantian understanding of mystical experiences (see Chapter 3 ,  
Section 3) .  To do so vitiates the presumption of  veridicality. 
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needs to be told about how to keep a restraint on the formation of 
any belief in any set of conditions and experiences whatsoever; ar­
bitrariness knocks at the door. The egalitarian assumption provides 
a kind of control over what can be legitimately taken as properly 
basic; it is a backdrop assumption needed for the avoidance of arbi­
trariness. 30 
I have presented Plantinga's pos1t1on on rationality and the 
proper basicality of beliefs about God. From this emerged his par­
ity thesis. The universality challenge to this version of the parity 
thesis suggests that Plantinga needs to explain why we do not all 
generate the same beliefs, given the same experience. There are 
several possibilities in this regard. In the next chapter I explain four 
of them. Of these, the first three are unlikely candidates for giving 
aid to Plantinga. The last, although a better candidate, leaves Plan­
tioga with results that are less than sanguine. 
30. There may, in fact, be other ways to provide the control needed, but the 
egalitarian assumption is a place to begin, even if ultimately not correct. Alston· has 
suggested to me, on several occasions, his own reluctance to admit that the egali­
tarian assumption is correct. 
